Block RAMs (BRAMs) are commonly used by implemen tations of cryptographic algorithms on Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Unfortunately, any hardware imple mentation of a cryptographic function is susceptible to differ ential power analysis (DPA) attacks unless it is protected. Dy namic and Differential Logic (DDL) , a constant power con sumption logic style, is the most popular and successful de fense method against DPA attacks. The required Measure ments to Disclosure (MTD) of the key has been shown to be larger than the life period of the secret key in most systems. DDL implementations on FPGAs proposed till date incur a large area overhead. In this paper we show that BRAMs can be used within a DDL design without compromising its se curity. We propose and analyze several implementation tech niques for using BRAMs in DDL designs. Our results show that such DDL implementations increase the MTDs by a fac tor 4 over unprotected designs which use BRAMs and by a factor 2.5 over DDL implementations which do not use BRAMs.
INTRODUCTION
An FPGA consists of programmable Look-Up Tables (LUTs) , flip-flops, Block RAMs (BRAMs), etc. and a network of pro grammable interconnects. In Xilinx Spartan 3 FPGAs two LUTs and two flip-flops are combined to one slice, four slices to one Configurable Logic Block (CLB). Four LUTs within each CLB can be configured as so called Distributed RAM of 16-bit per LUT. Each CLB has a dedicated switch box which provides programmable connections between slices and the FPGA wide routing network. Special interconnects are pro vided between a BRAM and its adjacent CLBs. BRAMs con sist of static RAM cells and contain 18,432 bits of total RAM. Each has two completely independent access ports called Port A and Port B. Each port is synchronous with its own clock, clock enable and write enable [1] . BRAMs can be used as data storage, FIFOs, large (LUTs), data width converters, cir cular buffers, shift registers, wide logic functions and other 978-1-4244-8157 -6/1 0/$26.00 ©20 10 IEEE 1244 basic functional primitives of cryptographic algorithms. However, data integrity sensitive applications are vulnera ble to passive, non-invasive attacks such as Differential Power Analysis (DPA) attacks. These attacks are powerful, easy to mount and almost guarantee success every time. Therefore, many countermeasures against DPA attacks were proposed. One such countermeasure is Dynamic and Differential Logic (DDL) introduced by Tiri [2] . DDL tries to "hide" the se cret data by achieving constant power consumption per clock cycle using the following two basic principles.
Constant switching activity: During each clock cycle ei ther a gate output in the direct path switches or the corre sponding gate output in the complementary path.
Constant load capacitance: The capacitive loads driven by the gates in the direct path are equal to the loads driven by the gates in the complementary path. DDL achieves these goals by duplication of the original circuit into direct and complementary parts. During the precharge phase all gate outputs are set to logic '0', during evaluation phase either the direct output evaluates to logic' 1 ' or the complementary output.
Separated DDL for FPGAs (SDDL for FPGAs) is a vari ant of DDL tailored for lightweight implementations on FP GAs [3] . It allows FPGA CAD tools to have maximum flex ibility to optimize a given design for the target FPGA. Such an optimized design allows logic packing in LUTs and also allows the use of FPGA intrinsic features such as BRAMs. A variant of the SDDL logic style called iWDDL is described in [4] . It extracts negative logic and isolates the resulting in verters between flip-flops. The authors analyze the usage of Distributed RAMs with iWDDL. In [5] , the authors propose BCDL, a variant of Wave DDL [2] (WDDL), which uses all positive logic. It directly applies precharge as one of the in puts to the Look-up Tables (LUTs) and as a part of the address for BRAMs, which is similar to our design in Fig. 3 . However this method leads to memory usage increase by a factor of 4. In this paper we introduce a method that halves that increase.
The focus of this paper is to verify whether BRAMs in DDL implementations enhance or diminish their security. We propose several implementation techniques which facilitate the use of BRAMs in DDL implementations in Sect. 2. We test our designs on a circuit which uses basic functional prim- 
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IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS
1. One Clock Cycle Operation
In this method, the precharge and evaluation phase share one clock cycle. The evaluation phase is defined by the "low" clock signal and the precharge phase by the "high" clock sig nal. This allows flip-flops to clock in new data at the rising edge of the clock as this is the transition from evaluation to precharge. The advantage of the one clock cycle operation is that the precharged circuit can be clocked with the same clock signal elk as external non-precharged circuits. The Pre input of the circuits in Fig. I-Fig. 3 is connected to the elk signal. In order to precharge the output of a LUT we use the tech nique proposed in [6] . The flip-flop following the LUT is configured as an asynchronously cleared latch. It forces the output of the slice to logic '0' during the precharge phase as shown in Fig. 1 .
We precharge the output of a flip-flop in a similar manner and connect the flip-flop output to an asynchronously cleared latch (Fig. 2) . Because the flip-flops within a slice share a common enable, clear, and clock input, we have to use a flip flop of a different slice for the precharge latch. In earlier ex periments [3] we discovered that connections within a CLB do not leak any exploitable information, however, connec tions between CLBs do. Therefore, we place the precharge latch in a flip-flop within the same CLB as shown in [7] .
Unfortunately we cannot use the approach that we used for LUTs and flip-flops to precharge BRAMs If we use a precharge latch for a BRAM, wiring resources would be used to connect the non-precharged BRAM output to a CLB. This leads to information leakage. Nassar [5] uses a bit of the ad dress to select a region of memory in which all data values are '0'. We use the MSB of the address for this as shown in Fig. 3 . However, this doubles the memory usage within a BRAM which might not be feasible for memory demanding applications. One rising edge of Dclk resets the outputs of the BRAM to '0', the following releases the data stored at the address given in the previous Dclk cycle. This introduces a delay for the address by one Dclk cycle which we compensate for with a flip-flop. The flip-flop output is connected using leaky wiring resources to the BRAM, however, as can be seen in Fig. 4 this signal is precharged. Even though this precharge occurs during the evaluation phase this does not violate the goal of constant switching activity. The contents of the BRAMs are complemented using Eq. (1).
BRAM(addr) = BRAM (addr)
(1)
Two Clock Cycle Operation
In this method, each phase, precharge and evaluate, takes a full clock cycle. Therefore, the precharged circuit has to run at twice the clock speed of external circuits. The precharge signal Pre reflects the phases and is low for one clock cycle and high for one clock cycle.
The circuit for precharging the output of a LUT shown in Fig. 1 does not need to change for this method. Only the Pre input needs to be connected to the Pre signal. As we have now one full clock cycle for each phase, we can simplify the precharge circuit for flip-flops by just adding another flip-flop instead of a latch as shown in Fig. 5 . The placement constraint we had for flip-flop precharge can now be relaxed as all sig nals are precharged.
For precharging the BRAM outputs in this method the cir cuits shown in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 apply. However, the Delk in put must be connected to the elk signal and the Pre input to the Pre signal. The Test Design circuit consists of a synchronous (Sync.) S Box whose input is connected to an 8-bit LFSR and output is XORed with an 8-bit Key. The result is stored in a register. The block diagram of this circuit is shown in Fig. 6(a) . The Sync. S-Box can be implemented using look-up tables and a register as in Fig. 6(b) , or a BRAM as in Fig. 6(c) . The later option absorbs the register. The "Pre" blocks indicated in Fig. 6 are implemented using the different precharge op tions discussed in Sect. 2. We use the term Single Ended (SE) design to refer to the unprotected designs in this paper. In order to implement the SDDL versions of the SE designs we use the secure design flow described in [7] . It describes the step-by-step process of precharging, duplicating and comple menting the logic. In our attacks we use Pearson's correlation to correlate instantaneous power consumption with hamming Pest. = HD(ljST(i_ l ), SBOX-l (kguess EB Qi)) (2) Pest. = HD(OxOO, SBOX-l (kguess EB Qi))
Attack point I, indicated in Fig. 6 by arrow I, is the precharged output of the LFSR. At attack point 2 data arrives half a clock cycle later than at point I during single cycle clock operation.
In case of two clock cycle operation the data arrives at point 2 one clock cycle later compared to point I. Hence, in order to attack the design at point 2 appropriate adjustments must be made while correlating the data with the power models. Table I compares the results of SE designs with several SDDL implementations with regards to area consumption, speed and Measurements to Disclosure (MTD) of the key. The results for MTD were obtained from the plots shown in Fig. 7 . By comparing the MTD of the key between between the SE De signs I and 2, it is clear that BRAMs provide some inherent resistance against DPA attacks. All SDDL implementations of Design 2, namely Designs 4-7, have a 4 times higher MTD compared to the unprotected Design 2. Furthermore, they are more secure than Design 3 which is also an SDDL imple mentation but does not use BRAMs. We note that there is no difference in security between using address or SSR to force the BRAM output to '0' during precharge as can be seen from Fig.7(c) and Fig. 7(f) . Hence, we can conclude that lowering memory usage by using SSR does not impact security in a negative way. At attack point 2 the output of the flip-flop is precharged during the evaluation phase and the data evaluates during precharge phase. At attack point I the data follows the phases normally. Fig.7(c) and Fig. 7 (e) show that this has no impact on security as the MTDs at both points are equivalent. In this paper, we proposed and analyzed different im plementation techniques for using BRAMs in DDL designs. Our results indicate that DDL implementations with BRAMs increase the MTDs by a factor 4 over unprotected designs which use BRAMs and a factor 2.5 over DDL implementa tions which do not use BRAMs. 
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